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The integration of the world economy has underlined the need for firms to exploit their 
intangible assets on a global scale. Firms’ intangible assets include their stock of knowledge, 
which is related to ideas, research and development (R&D), patent and blueprints, scientific 
and technical workers, and management techniques. In addition, intangible assets consist of 
their stock of goodwill, which is associated with product quality reputation, trademarks, and 
brand names. 
 
The empirical evidence shows that the growth in intangible assets has been a recent 
phenomenon. As emphasized by Griliches (1994), the source of economic growth and wealth 
lies no longer in the investment of physical, tangible assets but in the creation and use of 
intangible assets. The contribution of the latter is hard to measure due to lack of data and 
uniform definition concerning its measurement. There is, however, substantial anecdotal 
evidence that enterprises have increased their relative investment in intangible assets. The 
pace of intangible investment by U.S. private firms has risen sharply in recent decades. By the 
late 1990s, their investments in intangible assets were around 1 trillion dollars a year, which 
was about the same as expenditure on tangible assets (Nakamura 2001). 
 
The traditional explanation of multinational enterprises (MNEs) rests on the existence of firm-
specific intangible assets. These assets give MNEs offsetting advantages over foreign 
producers because  they have the property of joint inputs. Relative to physical tangible assets, 
intangible assets are easier and cheaper to transfer to foreign subsidiaries. For instance, 
blueprints and patents are very costly to produce but once they are created, they can be 
supplied to any foreign subsidiaries without reducing their value or productivity. Investing in 
tangible assets typically involves fixed costs at the plant level, whereas investing in intangible 
assets involves fixed costs at the level of the firm. 
 
The empirical evidence confirms thatMNEs have a larger value of intangible assets relative to 
their market value (compared to other firms). Industries with a high proportion of 
multinational firms tend to be characterized by high levels of intangible assets (evidenced as 
substantial R&D and advertising expenditures relative to sales), new or sophisticated 
products, and high shares of skilled employment (Markusen 1995). Since the early 1990s, for 
instance, the stock of business services has risen ninefold, to reach 26 percent of total inward 
foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in services in 2002 (UNCTAD 2004). 
 
Understanding the importance of intangible assets for FDI requires investigating their 
transferability to local firms and their impact on host economies. 
 
Transferability of Knowledge-Based Assets Transferring knowledge-based assets to local 
firms is quite different from transferring other intermediate inputs. Knowledge is not 
necessarily easily transferred, especially across firms. The reason is that knowledge-based 
assets are usually deeply embedded in the institutional and organizational contexts of 
their origins. Moreover, knowledge-based assets have a tacit component that is not codified 
and therefore is imperfectly transferable to local firms. For instance, production processes 
requiring highly specialized workers are usually transferred to subsidiaries rather 
than to other firms since licensing would entail costly training of local employees (Teece 
1986). The transmission of knowledge-based assets is subject to market failures such as the 
dilution of property rights. Product reengineering, for example, may allow the local firm to 
discover the tacit knowledge embedded in the newproduct and to starta rival firm. In addition, 
the MNE might break the terms of the license and transfer the knowledge-based asset to a 
different local firm. The problem for the MNE is to design an optimal contract that preserves 
the value of its knowledge-based assets. This contract usually includes rent sharing with the 
local firm. If defection cannot be avoided, the MNE will prefer to internalize its assets in spite 
of higher setupcosts. 
The empirical evidence presented by Smith (2001) on U.S. firms’ foreign operations shows 
that licensing is a more likely entry mode in markets characterized by stronger protection of 
intellectual property rights. 
 
Transferability of Goodwill Assets The stock of knowledge is not the only intangible asset 
that is difficult to transfer to local firms. The transfer of goodwill assets such as reputation for 
quality can face severe problems if the local firm does not fully appropriate the returns from 
maintaining the MNE’s brand reputation. Examples of industries where reputation is 
important include hotels and restaurants, consulting, and financial services. The reputation 
problem faced by MNEs is as follows. Consumers value quality and are willing to pay more if 
they believe that the firm is supplying high-quality products or services. The local firm may 
be tempted to compromise on products’ quality to reduce costs This strategy leads to higher 
short-term profit, but once consumers become disappointed with their purchases, the MNE 
may retaliate and purchase products from other suppliers. 
 
The fact that foreign parties do not fully appropriate the returns from maintaining the MNE’s 
reputation gives rise to FDI. The local firm does not internalize the costs to the global 
reputation of the MNE when it provides low-quality goods. This problem is why the MNE 
should design contracts that specify much more than prices. In practice, the usual method to 
achieve such a result is a franchise contract in which the local firm agrees on a complete 
business concept. The contract needs to ensure that the local firm provides a level of quality 
sufficient to maintain the reputation of the MNE. However, the franchising agreement will 
still not be sufficient to solve the reputation problem when efforts to maintain the quality of 
products and/or services are not fully verifiable. In this case, the MNE may prefer to set up its 
own subsidiary, which allows more effective incentive and control systems. 
 
Intangible Assets and Spillovers to Foreign Economies Researchers have attempted to identify 
and empirically measure spillovers from MNEs’ transfer of intangible assets to local firms. 
These spillovers may be positive or negative. On the one hand, MNEs may enable local firms 
to upgrade their technology, to the extent that they bring better business practices, technology, 
or management. On the other hand, MNEs may increase competition by attracting demand 
away from local firms. If economies of scale are important, the loss of demand will reduce the 
productivity of local firms by reducing the scale of their production. Positive or negative 
spillovers may be direct, from firm to firm, through imitation of technology, managerial 
and organizational innovations, or competition. They can also be indirect through the labor 
market when specialized skilled workers from the MNE are complementary to workers in the 
local firm or when they move to rival firms. In either case, the ability of local firms to 
assimilate or value new knowledge, the so-called absorptive capacity, is crucial for obtaining 
significant benefits from FDI. 
 
There is weak evidence for spillovers from MNEs.Positive spillovers from multinational firms 
are supported by casual evidence from many countries, but their existence and magnitude are 
difficult to establish empirically (UNCTAD 2001). Several studies have emphasized the role 
of local firms’ absorptive capacity in explaining the lack of spillovers from multinational 
activities. This reasoning suggests that spillovers may not affect firms equally but may benefit 
only firms with high levels of absorptive capacity. The lack of strong empirical evidence for  
spillovers suggests also that multinational firms have succeeded in protecting their intangible 
assets. 
In sum, intangible assets are vital to the incentives for MNEs to form and vital to the ability of 
MNEs to continue to prosper. Successful MNEs have valuable intangible assets, transfer the 
benefits of these intangibles to subsidiaries producing abroad, and protect their intangible 
assets by limiting the degree that the benefits spill over to rival firms.  
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